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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' "Statement of Facts" contains so 
many extraneous matters that it is unsatisfactory as 
a basis for a discussion of the legal questions in-
volved. We are not here concerned with the owner-
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ship, area or state of improvement of properties or 
tracts owned by other persons. This case involves 
only certain land which belonged to appellants and, 
in view of the award by this court of an extraordi-
nary writ requiring the payment to appellants of 
the damages fixed by the jury, the sole and only 
question with which we are now concerned is 
whether, under the law, appellants are entitled to a 
new trial in an effort to obtain greater damages 
than fixed by the jury, all other defenses being ex-
pressly waived by the filing by appellants of the 
receipt for the money already awarded. 
The property condemned, described in plain-
tiff's complaint as Parcel 28, is in one body, every 
area of which, for whatever the same was or is suit-
able, is contiguous to some other area within the 
boundaries of said parcel. It is true that running 
through said parcel is State Highway 65, which fur-
nishes ingress and egress to and from Emigration Can-
yon, a county road known as Kennedy Drive, and 
certain drives laid out by appellants within that area 
of Parcel 28 most suitable for residential purposes; 
but none of these roads or drives constituted any ob-
struction tq passing from one part of the premises 
to another. The location .of these roads was not re-
garded as important in appellants' division of the 
property into six parcels as shown on the map, made 
part of their application to sever, to which reference 
will hereafter be made. Furthermore, the best evi-
dence· that Parcel 28 is one parcel, and so regarded 
by the appellants themselves, is that the drives laid 
out or improved with surfacing or curb and gutter, 
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were so designed and located by appellants as to 
serve so much of the tract as was suitable for homes 
(approximately 50 acres being so mountainou·s as 
to be considered waste land), and the water -distrib-
uting system, supplied from tanks located on the up-
per, or waste land, area, the telephone conduits, gas 
mains and electric lines were all likewise constructed 
to serve the property as a unit. It is also to be noted 
that the entire area of said Parcel 28 was vacant and 
unoccupied and was outside the limits of Salt Lake 
City. A small area of about seven acres had been 
platted as a county subdivision under Chapter 50, 
Title 78, Utah Code Annotated 1943, whereby the 
fee to the drives or streets laid out therein became 
vested in Salt Lake County, (Sec. 78-5-4). 
Except for the contention of appellants that they 
were prejudiced by the court's order in making a di-
vision of Parcel 28 for the purpose of assessing val-
ues, it would be unnecessary to make reference to the 
"Motion to Sever" (R. 51) filed by appellants in 
the trial court, whereby they sought to have the court 
order that the area sought to be condemned be di-
vided into six parcels as described in the affidavit of 
Dean F. Brayton and as exhibited by the map at-
tached to said affidavit (R. 44, 47). In his affidavit, 
Mr. Brayton avers that in his opinion 
"It will simplify the trial of said cause and 
the convenience of the parties to try separately 
the issues as to the values of the land compris-
ing each of said parcels. Failure to so segregate 
and sever will, in affiant's opinion, tend to con-
fuse the issues and result in an inordinately long 
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trial with attendant burden upon court person .. 
nel and the parties." (R. 46.) 
Respondent contended that Parcel 28 is but one 
parceL but the court, in his discretion, while refus .. 
ing to permit a trial as to each, entered an order di .. 
viding said parcel into tw-o parcels, each to be sep .. 
ara tel y assessed by one jury. Each parcel was so 
assessed and the jury found an aggregate value as 
of July 12, 1951, of $495,875.00, to which was 
added $111.40 costs, making a total of $495,986.40 
for which judgment was entered, and that amount 
was paid into court for appellants within the time 
fixed by statute. 
Appellants then moved the court to amend the 
judgment by adding thereto interest at the legal rate 
from July 12, 1951, until payment of the judgment 
should be made (R. 127), which motion was denied. 
Then, after the judgment of condemnation was en-
tered whereby respondent became entitled to posses-
sion of the property upon payment of the award, ap-
pellants filed their "Application For Payment" 
wherein they prayed that the court order 
"the money so paid into court to be delivered 
to applicants upon filing a receipt therefor; such 
payment to be held to be an abdonment by such 
applicants of all defenses interposed by them 
excepting their claim for greate·r compensation, 
to wit, for interest on the sum of $495~875.00 
from July 12, 1951, until date of payment." 
(R. 140.) (Italics ours.) 
When this application was presented, the court 
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stated that he would not make the order applied for 
and thus leave open for litigation only the question 
of interest,-the only additional compensation claimed 
by appellants,- (the court having already denied the 
application to amend the judgment so as to award 
such interest), and His Honor three times, requested 
counsel for appellants to elect whether he desired an 
order in accordance with the statute that payment be 
made upon satisfaction of the judgment or upon ap-
pellants' filing a receipt abandoning all defenses ex-
cept their claim for greater compensation. Counsel 
three times refused to make any such election and 
thereupon the court ordered the money to be paid 
on satisfaction of judgment. (See affidavit of Judge 
Van Cott in Peek et al. v. State of Utah, included in 
the Record in this case by special order of this court 
December 31, 1952.) The appeal is "from the judg-
ment for damages in the sum of $495,986.40, in-
cluding costs, entered in the above action on the 1Oth 
day of May, 1952, and the 15th day of May, 1952, 
and from the final judgment of condemnation entered 
herein on the 27th day of May, 1952." (R. 146.) 
With these facts in mind, does the record show 
any prejudicial error committed by the trial court 
which entitles appellants to a new trial? 
ARGUMENT 
While some other points are set forth in their 
"Statement of Points" (R. 14 7-148), the only points 
appellants argue in their brief are that the court erred: 
1. In refusing to allow interest from July 12, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
1951, the date of the service of summons. (App. 
Br. 9.) 
2. -In refusing to permit appellants to cross ex-
amine plaintiff's expert witness, Edward M. Ashton, 
as to market value of comparable property as of July 
12, 19 51, including specifically the price paid for In-
dian Village, and in excluding evidence of such values. 
(App. Br. 9-10.) 
3. In refusing to permit a separate valuation 
of the water system. 
4. In ruling that the land sought to be con-
demned consisted of but two parcels. 
5. In eliminating the issue of severance dam-
ages. (App. Br. 10.) Let us consider these assign-
ments in their order. 
Interest From Date of Service of Summons Not 
Allowdble 
As we understand appellants' argument, it is that 
they are entitled to interest from the date of service 
of summons because the property here involved was 
Htaken" by the State by virtue of the passage of the 
Act (Laws, First Special Session, 19 51, page 17), by 
which the Engineering Commission was ''authorized 
and directed to forthwith condemn." This conten-
tion is without merit. In City of Norwalk v. Nor-
walk Investment Company (Conn.), 110 A. 557, 
the statute provided: 
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"Said bridge and park are hereby declared 
to be a public use and necessity, * * * and the 
said park is hereby established and laid out with 
the boundaries herein described.'' 
and the City of Norwalk was, by the statute, au-
thorized to condemn. The owner claimed interest 
from the date of the passage of the Act, but it was 
held that the Act did not constitute the "taking," 
and the claim of the owner was denied. 
The said Act of our legislature became effective 
June 18, 19 51. Therefore, if the passage of the Act 
constituted a "taking," appellants, logical! y, should 
claim interest from June 18, 19 51, instead of from 
July 12, 19 51. However, it is scarcely worthwhile 
to argue that the enactment of the statute was not a 
"taking," for the Act provides that the Engineering 
Commission shall "forthwith condemn," which, of 
course, contemplated the usual judicial procedure in 
"taking," that is, to establish the necessity for the 
taking, to fix the value of the property and estab-
lish, by decree of condemnation, the State's right to 
possession thereof upon payment of such value. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution which appellants quote in their Brief, gives 
no guaranty that appellants shall receive interest, or 
even any amount of damages or compensation. That 
provision merely guarantees that the State shall pro-
vide a proper procedure whereby compensation shall 
be fixed. It has been repeatedly held that 
''All that is essential is that in some appro-
priate way, before some properly constituted tri-
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bunal, inquiry shall be made as to the amount of 
compensation, and when this has been provided 
there is that due process of law which is re-
quired by the federal constitution.'' 
A. Backus, Jr. ~ Sons v. Fort Street, etc. Company, 
169 U. S. 557, 42 L. Ed. 853; Appleby v. Buffalo, 
221 U.S. 524, 55 L. Ed. 838. 
Appellants evidently did not consider their prop-
erty had been taken either by the passage of the Act 
or by the service of the summons for, on December 14, 
19 51, they filed their ''Notice Re Motion For Imme-
diate Occupancy" (Add. R. 60), calling up for dis-
position what they designated as plaintiffs HMotion 
for Immediate Occupancy." As a matter of fact, 
respondent had neither filed nor made any such mo-
tion; its only reference to occupancy being the sec-
ond paragraph of the prayer of the complaint, to wit: 
''That upon notice being given to the vari-
ous defendants in the manner prescribed by law, 
the plaintiff be given_ an order authorizing the 
immediate occupancy of the designated premises 
for the purpose of commencing such construc-
tion and improvement of a state park." (R. 19.) 
Yet counsel state in their Brief: 
"When defendants called up plaintiffs Mo ... 
tion For Occupancy, plaintiff resisted its own 
motion." (App. Br. 11.) 
Respondent did resist an order of immediate oc ... 
cupancy because it had made no motion therefor, and 
no notice had been given to defendants that a request 
would be made for any such order. 
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As to whether compensation should include in-
terest from the date of service of summons, we have 
only to say that, unless this court determines that its 
former decisions are erroneous, and should be over-
ruled, there is no merit in appellants' contention. Ore-
gon Short Line Railroad Company v. Jones, 29 Utah 
147, 80 P. 732; San Pedro Railroad v. Boa·rd of Edu-
cation, 35, Utah 13, 99 P. 263; Salt Lake etc. Rail-
road v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189·P. 90. See also 
State v. Danielson et al., - Utah -, 247 P. (2d) 
900. 
California, with the same statute as Utah, has 
declared the same rule as prevails here. (City of Los 
Angeles v. Gager, 102 P. 17; City of Oakland v. 
Wheeler, 168 P. 23.) 
Appellants' contention that they should be al-
lowed interest because their possession, after the serv-
ice of summons, was ''worthless'' and their develop-
ment operations interfered with, is answered by Judge 
Straup in Oregon Short Line Railroad v. Jones, supra. 
To quote: 
"Under section 3599, appellants argue that 
the right to compensation accrues and is due on 
the date of the service of summons, and because 
thereof, and because no improvements put upon 
the property subsequent to that date· shall be in-
cluded in the assessment of compensation or dam-
ages, there is, when the summons is served, such 
an interference with the full enjoyment and or-
dinary benefits of the property by the owner, 
and such an invasion of his rights thereto, as to 
amount, in legal effect, in a taking, within the 
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meaning of the Constitution providing that 'pri-
vate property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation.' And it 
is claimed, as the property was taken on that 
date, and as compensation therefor then became 
due, appellants were entitled to interest thereon 
from the date of the service of summons to ver-
dict, less rents and other benefits of possession 
received by them covering the same period. When 
all the provisions and proceedings relating to the 
eminent domain act for condemnation of prop-
erty are considered we are persuaded that ap-
pellants' claim cannot prevail. In determining 
this claim to interest, much depends upon when, 
in the proceedings, the taking of the property 
took place. While the law is most exacting that 
private property shall not be taken without com-
pensation, still the condemner is not required 
to make that compensation until he does take, 
either actual! y or constructive! y." 
* * * * 
"Considering again our statute, it is quite 
clear it excludes any claim to interest, at least 
such as is here made. It says in plain terms that 
the 'actual value at that date (service of sum-
mons) shall be the measure of compensation for 
all property to be actual! y taken,' etc. ; that is, 
the Legislature has said the actual value of the 
land-no more or less-shall be the compen-
sation to be assessed. Within thirty days after 
final judgment plaintiff must 'pay the sum of 
money assessed.' He can pay no less. The stat-
ute does not require him to pay more. He has 
thirty days within which to make that payment. 
To also .allow interest to be computed on the 
verdict, the 'measure of compensation' is some-
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thing more and in addition to the 'actual value' 
of the property at the date of service of summons. 
When the statute says the actual value of the 
land to be actually taken shall be the measure of 
compensation, and that plaintiff shall have final 
order of condemnation upon the payment of the 
sum of money assessed, it has excluded all other 
conditions. (San Fran. ~ S. J. V. Ry. Co. v. 
Leviston, 134 Cal. 412, 66 Pac. 473.) To al-
low appellants' claim of interest to prevaiL we 
are obliged to read something into the statute 
not found there." 
The case of Fell v. U. P. Railroad Company, 32 
Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, cited by appellants, has no 
application here. That was an action for injury to 
livestock and the court held that 
"The true test to be applied as to whether 
interest should be allowed before judgment in a 
given case or not, is, therefore, not whether the 
damages are liquidated or otherwise, but whether 
the injury and consequent damages a•re complete 
* * * ." (Italics ours.) 
Here the damage was not complete until the ques-
tion of necessity of taking the property for public use 
had been determined (denied by appellants in this 
case) and there can be no damage until there is a 
"taking". Besides, this court has definite! y construed 
the eminent domain statute. 
Even if any such damage for any period prior 
to possession, by way of interest or otherwise, were 
recovable (which it is not), appellants would not 
be entitled to any such damage without specific proof 
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thereof, and no such proof was offered, which of it-
self would prevent the recovery of interest. (Town 
of Hingman v. U.S., 161 Fed. 295; U.S. v. Holden, 
268 Fed. 223.) 
It is also a fact that the long period which elapsed 
after the service of summons and before verdict, for 
which period appellants claim interest, was due, in 
large part, to the ''Request For Admission'' (R. 48), 
"Motion For Summary Judgment" (R. 49), "Mo-
tion to Sever" (R. 51), Pre-trial order of January 22, 
1952 (see paragraph 5 thereof, R. 52, 56), "Notice 
of Motion Re Immediate Occupancy'' (Add. R. 60), 
"Motion For Further Hearing and Supplemental Af-
fidavit of Dean F. Brayton" (R. 79, 68), and other 
dilatory proceedings by appellants themselves. 
In Brown v. U.S., 263 U.S. 78, 68 L. Ed. 17L 
the court did approve the allowance of interest from 
the date of service of summons until the payment of 
the jury's award, but-the decision is not based- upon 
any constitutional right of the owner to receive such 
interest, but purely upon the basis of the construction 
of the Idaho statute by the Federal Court for Idaho, 
to the effect that the date of the service of summons 
was the date of the "taking" and the Supreme Court 
declared it to be its policy to follow the construction 
given the statute by the court of the jurisdiction where-
in the case arose. Says the court: 
"It is better, when possible, to act in har-
mony rather than in conflict with the established 
policy of a state." 
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In U. S. v. Rogers, 255 U. S. 163, 65 L. Ed. 
566, the United States brought an action in the United 
States Court for New Mexico to condemn lands for 
reclamation purposes. The court calls attention to 
the conformity act which in effect provides that prac-
tice, pleadings, forms and proceedings arising under 
that act shall conform to the practice of the state in 
which the action is brought. In due course the award 
of compensation was made and the owners of the 
land subsequently made a motion for a supplemental 
order requiring the government to deposit additional 
money equal to six per cent interest calculated from 
the time that the lands were taken by flooding, and 
the court made that order. The Supreme Court com-
ments: 
"It appears that the allowance of interest 
was from the time of the actual taking of the 
land to the time deposit was made in payment 
for the same. * * * 
"It is unquestionably true that the United 
States upon claims made against it cannot, in 
the absence of a statute to that end, be subjected 
to the payment of interest (citing cases). The 
government was seeking for purposes authorized 
by statute to appropriate the lands, and it had 
actually taken them, and had deprived the own-
ers of all beneficial use thereof from the date 
from which the allowance of interest ran. 
"Having taken the lands of the defendant 
in error, it was the duty of the government to 
make just compensation as of the time when the 
owners were deprived of their property (citing 
authority). 
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"In fixing the compensation the d.istrict 
court and the Circuit Court of Appeals tn af-
firming the judgment followed the ~ew Mexico 
statute fixing the rate of in.terest at stx per ce.nt. 
This was in conformity wtth the former ruhng 
of the Circuit Court of Appeals applying the 
statute of Minnesota to lands appropriated in 
that state. U. S. v. Sargent, 89 CCA 81, 1~2 
F. 81. 
'.'The government urges that the conform-
ity act of August 1, 18 8 8, does not require the 
United States government to be bound by the 
rule of the state statute in the allowance of in-
terest. This may be true, but we agree with 
the courts below that the allowance of just com-
pensation by giving interest from the time of 
taking until payment is a convenient and fair 
method of ascertaining the sum to which the 
owner of the land is entitled. The fact that 
the rule is in harmony with the policy of the 
state where the lands are situated does not mili-
tate against, but makes for the justice and pro-
priety of its adoption. U. S. v. Sargent, supra." 
So far as we are aware, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has never disapproved of the fore-
going pronouncement. 
The trial court did not err in refusing to amend 
the judgment to include interest from July 12, 1951, 
or refusing to order payment of the jury's award upon 
the filing by appellants of a receipt abandoning all 
defenses except their claim for such interest, which, 
by their application, they declared to be the only ad-
ditional compensation to which they were entitled. 
So much for the question of interest. 
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Evidence of Sale Price of Other P·ronert11. or of 
Residential Lots Within Area Adjacent to Land 
Condemned, Inadmissible 
The only portions of the Record which have to 
do with this question are hereafter set forth. Edward 
M. Ashton established, without question or objection, 
his qualifications as an expert on real estate values 
(Add. R. 2 9, 3 1 ) , and he testified as to the value of 
the property in question. At the conclusion of his 
cross examination (Add. R. 40) the following collo-
quy, between the court and counsel, occurred: 
''Mr. Behle: I assume, for the record, I 
am foreclosed in testing this witness in respect 
to comparative values on any basis; front foot,, 
acreage, per lot, as well as asking him in regard 
to his subdivision? 
"The Court: Well, you may, unless there 
is objection, proceed the same with him as you 
did with Mr. Kiepe. Is that what you mean? 
''Mr. Behle: Well, I thought the rulings 
cut me off from any of that, so I wanted to be 
sure. In other words, I understand I can't ask 
the witness what land in the vicinity comparable 
to this land sells for, either by an acre basis or 
a fran t foot basis, or a lot basis, is that correct? 
''The Court: Well, yes. I ruled against 
you on that with Mr. Kiepe and I would do the 
same with Mr. Ashton. 
''Mr. Behle: Yes, sure. In other words, 
I can't test on comparative sales, on comparative 
sales prices? 
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"The Court: That is correct. You can-
not." (Add. R. 40, 41.) 
* * * * 
~'Mr. Behle: If the Court please, I think 
the record is clear on our proffer of proof of com-
parable values. I think the door has been closed 
on us every time we have tried to prove and test 
values, and here is a specific instance. 
~'The Court: Well, the only reason that 
the door is closed to you is that the law pro-
vides that you shall not do that and I try to 
follow what the law is. I am not trying to close 
any door on you and if you have any doubt 
about it I can show you the authorities on the 
value of a place. Well, that case Mr. Budge had 
the other day covers that subject. It has not 
been permitted and you persist in it and it is 
against the law. 
"Mr. Behle: Well, of course, that is one 
of the arguments we have been having right 
along. 
"T.he Court: Well, that is right. Of 
course, I have been ruling against you because 
I have been ruling it is not lawful for you to 
divide this property into lots, nor the price per 
lot, or any other property into lots or the values 
of them. 
"Mr. Behle: But by the same token we 
have been absolutely foreclosed from testing these 
witnesses, opinions on the basis of comparable 
values in the area. 
"The Court: No, you haven't been fore ... 
closed, but you have been permitted to ask him 
to consider what those values are in the compa ... 
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rable values in the area. You haven't been fore-
closed.'! (Add. R. 42-43.) (Italics ours.) 
* * * * 
"Mr. Behle: We also specifically tender 
proof with respect to Indian Village as a com-
parable subdivision purchased on an acreage basis 
as raw acreage and the value per acre of 
$7,500.00 shortly before the date of condemna-
tion and the characteristics of that area as being 
comparable. 
''Mr. Budge: Same objection. 
''The Court: The objection is sustained. 
"Mr. Behle: For the record only we again 
make a tender in connection with lot sales and 
prtces. 
"Mr. Budge: Same objection. 
"The Court: Within the area being con-
demned? 
''Mr. Behle: Within the area and compa-
rable to the area. 
"Mr. Budge: Same objection. 
''The Court: The objection is sustained.' t 
(Add. R. 52.) 
In their Brief, appellants state: 
"It will also be readily remembered that a 
large portion of the Deere Estate lands consisted 
of subdivided residential lots, more than 20 of 
which had been sold to individual purchasers 
on the open market, to other defendants in the 
condemnation proceeding. Yet th'e court below 
absolutely excluded direct evidenec or cross ex-
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amination as to lot or acreage values of prop-
erty comparabl'e to either the lots or acreage of 
the Deere Estate.'' (Italics ours.) (Appellants' 
Brief, 24, 25.) 
* * * * 
"We would have thought it clear that the 
best evidence of market value of land, or for that 
matter almost any tangible property with a mar-
ket value, would be the actual figures as to which 
that or comparable property was selling for on 
the open market at about the time of the valua-
tion." (Appellants' Bri~f 26.) 
It is quite apparent from these statements that 
counsel's position at the trial was, and is now, that 
evidence of the value of other property should have 
been received, not for the purpose of testing the quali ... 
fication of the witness Ashton, for, as before stated, 
his qualification was never questioned, but as substan-
tive proof of the value of the land condemned. As to 
Indian Village, a subdivision, witness Ashton made 
it quite clear that the land within that project was 
not similar to the Deere Estate property. He testified 
that Indian Village "is not so hilly. It is more flat 
and right in the midst €>f development that is sur-
rounding, that is pretty high! y developed.'' (Add. 
R. 42.) So, even if evidence of value of comparable 
property woulq have been admissible (which we do 
not concede), Indian Village was not comparable 
either in location or character and the court did not 
err in refusing to permit the following question to be 
answered: 
"How much did you or your associates pay 
per acre for that raw land?" (Add. R. 42.) 
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There vvas no offer to show that any acreage 
(other than appellants claim with respect to Indian 
Village) was comparable to the Deere Estate property, 
or to show the value of any other acreage. Neither 
did the court err in rejecting appellants' offer of proof -
of the sale price of Indian Village (Add. R. 52) . 
(a) Value of Other Property 
In Maxwell v. Highway Com. (Ia.) 271 N. w.· 
883 the court declares: 
"Appellants also contend that the court 
erred in admitting the testimony of the witness, 
Joe Stratton, as to the sale price of other farms 
in a nearby community shortly prior to the con-
demnation of the land in question. These wit-
nesses testified over proper objection as to the 
sale price of such other lands. The rule with 
reference to the admissibility of this kind of tes-
timony seems to have been in some conflict until 
the decision in the case of Watkins v. Wabash 
Railroad Co., 137 Iowa, 441, 113 N. W. 924. 
In that case many authorities upon this ques-
tion were reviev1ed and a further discussion of 
the reasons of the rule there announced is deemed 
unnecessary here. 
"In that case this court said, 13 7 Iowa, 
441, loc. cit. 442, 113 N. W. 924, 925: 'It is 
to be conceded that under some circumstances 
testimony of this kind is admissible to show the 
knowledge of the witness and his competency to 
speak as an expert upon the subject concerning 
which he is being examined. This is especially 
true where the witness has assumed to express an 
opinion, and is being cross-examined for the pur-
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pose of testing the weight and value of his testi-
mony. King v. Iowa Midland Railroad Co., 
34 Iowa, 458; Winklemans v. Des Moines N. W. 
Railroad Co., 62 Iowa, 11, 17 N. W. 82; Cum-
mins v. Des Moines ~ St. L. Railroad Co., 63 
Iowa, 397, 19 N. W. 268; Hollingsworth v. 
Des Moines~ St. L. Railroad Co., 63 Iowa, 443, 
19 N. W. 325. But the practically universal 
rule is to the effect that such testimony is not 
admissible as substantive evidence of the value 
of the property which is the subject of the con-
troversy. That the offer of the testimony * * * 
was not intended simply to show the qualifica-
tion of the witn'ess to give an opinion of the 
value of plaintiff, s land can hardly be disputed 
from the record. * * * The witness had already 
s.hown his qualification by testifying to h'is own-
ership of land in that vicinity, and to his fa-
miliarity with land values in the neighborhood. 
Having th.us shown his qualification, he had 
been allowed to give his testimony without ob-
jection. Thereafter, and apparently for no other 
reason than to corroborate his estimate and give 
it additional strength and influence with the 
jury, he was allowed to state t.hat * * * after 
th'e condemnation proceedings * * * he had sold 
his own land at $60 per acre. In this we think 
there was prejudicial et"ror.', (Italics ours.) 
The statement we have italicized is especially appli-
cable here, for it appears from the record and· from ap-
pellants' Brief, that the proffer of proof of compara-
tive values of acreages (limited in this case to Indian 
Village) was for the purpose only of proving the 
value of the Deere Estate. 
In City of Los Angeles v. Deacon (Cal.), 7 P. 
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(2d) 3 78, the court, after stating that the question 
in eminent domain is, what is the market value of the 
property being condemned, states: 
"In arriving at an answer to this question 
for himself, a person of ordinary business judg-
ment would want to know the answer to anum-
ber of preliminary inquiries. It is just possible 
he would want to know at what figure the prop-
erty was assessed by the county assessor. He 
might find it of interest to know what value was 
put upon it by the appraisers when it was re ... 
cently involved in a probate proceeding. He 
certainly would be interested, if it was the mar-
ket value he sought to determine, in any offers 
that had been made for the property, and in the 
price at which it and property similarly situated 
had recently been sold. He would, most likely, 
be interested in the amount of profit that had 
been made in the use to which the property had 
been put. 
"But conceding that all these facts would 
be taken into consideration by one endeavoring 
to determine the market value of a piece of prop-
erty, it is nevertheless the settled law of this state 
that none of them may be proven for the put;-
pose of establishing the market value. The pro ... 
cedure which is recognized as proper is, for the 
witness when found to be qualified to give an 
opinion as an expert, to state, first, ~hat is, in 
his judgment, the market value of the property. 
(Citing authority.) On this, the examination 
in chief, it may not be shown: For what sum 
the property was assessed (citing authority); nor 
the value placed upon it by the appraisers in a 
probate proceeding (citing cases) ;· nor the price 
offered for the property being condemned (citing 
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cases) ; nor yet that offered or paid for lands in 
the neighborhood (Spring Valley Water-Works 
v. Drinkhouse (1891) 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 681; 
City of San Luis Obispo v. Brizzolara ( 1893) 
100 Cal. 434, 34 P. 1083; In re Estate of Ross 
( 1915) 171 Cal. 64, 151 P. 113 8; City of Los 
Angeles v. Hughes (1927) 202 Cal. 731, 262 
P. 73 7; Reclamation Dist. No. 730 v. lnglin 
(1916) 31 Cal. App. 495, 160 P. 1098; Pal-
ladine v. Imperial Valley F. L. Ass'n (1924) 65 
Cal. App. 727, 225 P. 291; ·Dickey v. Dunn 
( 1927) 80 Cal. App. 724, 252 P. 770; Fishel 
v. F. M. Ball~ Co., Inc. (1927) 83 Cal. App. 
128, 256 P. 493; Merchants' Trust Co. v. Hop-
kins, supra; and see leading case of Central Pac. 
R. R. Co. v. Pearson, supra). 'He should not be 
asked regarding specific facts in the examination 
in chief.' De Freitas v. Town of Suisun City, 
supra. On cross-examination, however, ques-
tions may be asked about these various matters: 
* * * prices offered and paid for other proper-
ties (citing authorities). When evidence of sales, 
etc., is received on cross-examination, however, 
it is solely for the purpose of testing the value 
of the witnesses' testimony; it is not in itself 
evidence of value of the property. (Citing cases.) 
Nor is the rule any different on redirect exam-
ination than it is on the opening examination in 
chief, even though some specific sales may have 
been gone into during the cross-examination. 
Reclamation Dist. No. 730 v. lnglin, supra." 
In Chicago, etc. Co. v. Muller, (Kan.) 25 P. 
21 0, the following is from the opinion: 
"In the cross-examination of the plaintiff, 
the question was asked as to what sales had been 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
made in the neighborhood, upon which he based 
his judgment as to values, and, without being 
asked, he volunteered this statement: 'A neigh-
bor of mine right north of me has one hundred 
and twenty acres, and was offered six thousand 
dollars.' The defendant in error moved that 
this statement of the witness be stricken out. 
The request was denied, and a proper exception 
made. This, we think, was error, and the court 
should hav~ withdrawn the statement from the 
. '' Jury. 
See also: 
Stinson v. R. R. Co. (Minn.), 6 N. W. 784. 
Helena etc. Co. v. McLean (Mont.), 99 P. 1061. 
Portland etc. Co. v. Penny (Ore.), 158 P. 404. 
Portland etc. Co. v. Ladd Est. Co. (Ore.), 155 
P. 1192. -
This court, in Telluride P. Co. v. Bruneau, 41 
P. 4, 125 P. 399, did not hold, as appellants claim 
(App. Br. 27), that evidence of comparative values 
is admissible. It holds that it was not prejudicial 
error to excl.ude such evidence on direct examination. 
It is not, therefore, likely that the court will now hold 
it to be error to exclude such evidence on cross-exam-
ination when it is not offered to test the qualification 
of the witness. 
(b) Value of Subdivision Lots 
#'-
The following offer by appellants was refused: 
"Mr. Behle: For the record only we again 
make a tender in connection with lot sales and 
prices.'' (Add. R. 52.) 
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Concerning this ruling, appellants state: 
Hit will also be readily remembered that a 
large portion of the Deere Estate lands consisted 
of subdivided residential lots, more than twenty 
of which had been sold to individual purchasers 
on the open market to other ·defendants in the 
condemnation proceeding. Yet the court below 
absolutely excluded dire~t evidence or cross ex-
amination as to lot or acreage values of property 
comparable to either the lots or acreage of the 
Deere Estate." (App. Br. 24-25.) 
It is likewise not permissible to introduce evi-
dence of the sales price of subdivision or other lots 
in the vicinity of the property to be condemned. 
In City of Los Angeles v. H.ughes (Cal.), 262 
P. 737, it is said: 
"A number of times during the trial the 
court asked questions as to whether the subdi-
vision possibilities had been taken into consider-
ation by the witness in arriving at his estimate 
of the market value and was assured that this 
had been done. The court also personally viewed 
the land and had an opportunity to see its char-
acter as well as the development of the surround-
ing property. 
"If the argument of counsel for these ap-
pellants is intended to go one step further, and 
it is sought to establish that the value of the 
land must be estimated not only on the basis 
of what the owners would be able to obtain for 
lots after subdivision had actually taken place 
(and the argument is open to that interpret~­
tion), we are unable to agree, nor do the cases 
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relied upon by these appellants support this con-
tention.'' 
The court then quotes with approval certain au-
thorities giving the correct rule for the determination 
of the value of the land sought to· be condemned, and 
then observes: 
''Under all of the authorities, both in this 
state and elsewhere, the true basis for computing 
the market value of land sought to be condemned, 
in view of evidence of its suitability for sub-
division purposes, is its value as it stood on the 
date when, under the law, its value was to be 
determined, plus any increased value which it 
may have had on the market by reason of its 
suitability for subdivision into city lots. 
''During the trial a witness was asked: 
'Q. Now you have a list of any sales made 
there that your figures are based on?' Objec-
tion was made to this evidence on direct exam-
ination of any specific sales, but the court stated 
that Mr. Smith 'could tell what he knows about 
sales out there.' This the witness proceeded to 
do. The ruling was erroneous and objection 
should have been sustained." 
In 18 Am. Jur., p. 881, the general rule is stated 
as follows: 
"* * * For example, when a tract taken by 
eminent domain is used as a farm, the owner is 
entitled to have its possible value for building 
purposes considered; but the jury or other tri-
bunal is not to determine how it could best be 
divided into building lots, nor conjecture how 
fast they could be sold, nor at what price per 
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lot. As a rule, projects of the owner in regard 
to the land are too remote and speculative. 
* * *" 
In Nichols on Eminent Domain, 2d ed. at page 
1170, it is stated: 
~~The owner cannot, for example, intro-
duce evidence of the return that he would derive 
from cutting up a vacant tract of land into build-
ing lots, since this would involve pure conjec-
ture as to how fast the lots would be sold and 
the price that each would bring; and the de-
tails of the possible improvement of the land, 
and its value, or the expected profits, or rentals 
after such improvement was completed, are equal-
ly inadmissible, for the same reason. The trial 
court cannot be too careful in excluding evidence 
of this character. * * *" 
In Pennsylvania S. V. R. Co. v. Cleary, 123 Pa. 
442 ( 1889), 17 Atl. 468, the court considered the 
value of a tract of land which was being condemned 
and for which the owner claimed damage on the basis 
of individual building lots. The court stated: 
"* * * It is proper to inquire what the 
tract is worth, having in view the purposes for 
which it is best adapted; but it is the tract, and 
not the lots into which it might be divided, that 
is to be valued. * * * 
* * * * 
~'We do not agree with the learned judge 
that there was any such question for the jury 
in this case. The jury are to value the tract of 
land and that only. They are not to determine 
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how it could best be divided into building lots, 
nor to conjecture how fast they could be sold, 
nor at what price per lot. A speculator or in-
vestor, in deciding what price he could afford 
to pay, would consider the chances and proba-
bilities of the situation as then actually exist-
ing. A jury should do the same thing. They 
are not to inquire what a speculator might be 
able to realize out of a resale in the future, but 
what a present purchaser would be willing to 
pay for it in the condition it is now in. This 
is a rule that is well settled, and the court should 
have drawn the attention of the jury to it, so as 
to have left no room for uncertainty on their 
part. They should have been told that they had 
nothing to do with the subdivision of this tract, 
the price of the lots, or the probability of their 
sale; but that they were to ascertain the fair sell-
ing value of the land before and after the entry 
by the railroad company, in order to determine 
the actual damage done to its owner.'' 
In the case of James L. Thornton v. City of 
Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651 (1940), 35 So. (2d) 
545, the court held generally that while the value 
of property for subdivision purposes may be con-
sidered in the condemnation procedings in ascertain-
ing its fair market value, it is not permissible to show 
the prospective selling price of individual lots. The 
court stated: 
''An analogous principle also condemns the 
effort of the appellant to introduce a tentative 
plan of a subdivision of the property, showing 
the prospective selling price of the individual 
lots therein. Evidence of value of the property 
for any use to which it is raesonably adapted is, 
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as already stated, admissible, but the proof must 
be so limited and the testimony restricted to its 
value for such purpose. Of probative tendency 
on this issue is the offer of a proposed plan or 
a possible scheme of development, and the trial 
court so held, but it was not permissible to in-
corporate in such a plan the speculative price 
of the individual lots." 
In accord with the foregoing authorities, it clear-
ly appears that witness Ashton based his values of 
the two parcels upon a consideration of the location 
and character thereof, with due regard to the topog-
raphy and to the highest possible use for which each 
parcel was suitable. He had laid out fifty subdivi-
sions in and about Salt Lake City. He had been fa-
miliar with the Deere Estate property for 40 years 
and recently had made a thorough examination of it. 
He was familiar with the improvements on each par-
cel and it- was upon the basis of all these facts that 
his valuation was based (Add. R. 31-3 7). The court 
was right in excluding evidence of the price received 
for separate lots in the vicinity of the residential area 
of the Deere Estate property. 
Evidence of Separate Value of Water Right and 
Water System, Inadmissible, 
Appellants complain that the court rejected evi-
dence of the separate value of the water right and 
water system. The following is shown by the record: 
''Mr. Behle: If the Court please, if we 
had been permitted through the witness, Ullrich, 
we would have p:t'oved that the water right was 
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worth $10,500.00 and the distribution system 
$63,700.00; of which $25,700.00 was allocated 
to the distribution syste·m within Parcel 1, the 
balance being the collecting works and reservoirs 
and the transmission lines. These are fair mar-
ket values as of July 15, 19 51. 
"We also make a tender of proof from Mr. 
Ray Christensen, the City Attorney of Salt Lake 
City, that such distribution systems-and I am 
speaking of that part within Parcel 1-have an 
independent value of their own and that in the 
event of annexation it is usual for the City to 
acquire that system as a part of its own water 
system, depending, of course, on the individual 
circumstances, and that it does comply with spec-
ifications and upon determining its value. 
"Mr. Budge: Well, of course, we object 
to that proof upon the ground that it is im-
proper and incompetent and that the land has 
been already valued with the improvements 
thereon included, and for the further reason that 
there has been no proof of ownership of water, 
no evidence of ownership, and therefore that any 
evidence of value would be incompetent and no 
evidence particularly of any quantity of water 
that was owned or that there is any ownership 
of any water. It would be impossible to have 
any value fixed without having first established 
the quantity of water that was owned and used, 
and there is no evidence at all of that, of the 
area.'' (Add. R. 16.) 
The objection was well taken upon all grounds 
stated. At the time of the offer no evidence had been 
introduced of ownership of any water right and none 
now appears in the record before t.h-is court. However, 
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it will be observed from appellants' brief that their 
objection to the court's ruling is, that separate value 
was proper not only because the water system was 
designed to serve the Deere Estate propertyt but be-
cause of its value for "ultimate use elsewhere after 
1952, when Oak Hills was to be connected with Salt 
Lake City municipal water system" (App. Br. 28-
29). Oak Hills was nott on July 12, 19 51, the date 
as of which value was to be determinedt within Salt 
Lake City and no application for its annexation had 
been filed. When would it become a city subdivi-
sion? When would it be connected with the mu-
nicipal water system? Where or for what purpose 
could the water right and system be ultimately used 
elsewhere than on Oak Hills, or to whom could it be 
sold for such ultimate use? The most that counsel 
claimed was that 
"the distribution systems * * * have an inde-
pendent value of their own and that in the event 
of annexation it is usual for the city to acquire 
that system as part of its own water system, 
depending, of course, on the individual circum-
stances, and that it does comply with specifica-
tions and upon determining its value" (Add. R. 
16.) (Italics ours.) 
Appellants offered to show a separate present 
value based on all manner of conjectures as to what 
might or might not occur in the future; without any 
proof that the system complied with city specifications 
and based upon a future determination of value. It 
is quite apparent that the court prope,rly denied such 
offer of proof. The ruling of _the court was proper 
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for the futher reason that the water right (if there 
was a water right) was appurtenant to the land and 
the water system an "improvement". The statute, 
Section 104-6-1, provides that the jury must ascer-
tain and assess 
"The value of the property condemned and all 
improvements thereon appertaining to the real-
,' ty, etc. 
The California statute is identical with our own, 
and in Vallejo v. Home Savings Bank, 140 Pac. 974, 
it is said: 
''Appellants sought by the same witness to 
show the market value of the improvements as 
separate from the realty; but the court held 'that 
the testimony must go to the market value of 
the property as a whole.' Complaint is made of 
this ruling, but it was strictly in accordance with 
the course prescribed by the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, Sec. 1248, subd. 1, as follows: 'The 
court, jury or referee * * * must ascertain and 
assess: ( 1) the value of the property sought to 
be condemned, and all improvements thereon per-
taining to the realty, and of each and every sep-
arate estate or interest therein; if it consists of 
different parcels, the value of each parcel and each 
estate or interest therein shall be separately as-
sessed.' It thus expressly appears that separate 
assessments are to be made when there are differ-
ent parcels of land, and, under the familiar rule 
of construction, the present case is excluded by 
implication.'' 
In Los Angeles v. Klinker (Cal.), 25 P. (2d) 
826, the court quotes with approval the following 
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from the New York case of Banner Milling Co. v. 
State, 148 N. E. 668, 672: 
" 'T,he claimant is entitled to recover the 
value of its physical property as it existed at the 
time of the appropriation. That does not mean 
that its value is t.o be arrived at by taking the 
value of the various elements and items making 
up the property separately, and considering them 
without reference to each other, and then adding 
together these sums. The claimant is entitled to 
compensation, not merely for so much land, so 
much brick, lumber, materials, and machinery, 
considered separately; but, if they have been com-
bined, adjusted, synchronized, and perfected into 
an efficient functioning unit of property, then 
it must be paid for that unit, so combined, ad-
justed, synchronized, and perfected, as it ex-
isted at the moment of appropriation. In that 
limited sense, it is entitled to the 'going value'-
if such a term is permissible-of its physical 
property. In fixing the amount of award we will 
be guided by that principle.' " 
See also Dept. of Public Works v. Hubbard (Ill.) 
1 N. E. (2d) 383. 
No Error in Dividing Parcel 28 Into Only Two 
Parcels for Trial 
The records of this court will show that appel-
lants on or about April 1, 19 52, applied for an inter-
mediate appeal from the trial court's order dividing 
Parcel 28, -as described in the complaint, into two 
parcels for the purposes of the trial and such applica-
tion was denied. Whether or not this decision was 
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tantamount to an approval of the trial court's order, 
or is res judicata of that question, it is nevertheless 
true that the trial court committed no error. As a 
matter of fact, Parcel 28 was, and is, only one parcel. 
It was in one ownership. It consists of one body of 
unoccupied land regarded by appellants themselves as 
a unit when they installed the water system, drives 
and other improvements to serve so much of the area 
as was usable. However, we made no objection to 
the segregation made by the court. 
The authorities cited by appellants are mostly 
quotations from text~, but, in general, are not against 
our contention under the facts in this case. 
How unwise and expensive it would have been 
for the court to order a division into six parcels as 
arbitrarily marked off on a plat exhibited by appel-
lants. And appellants insisted upon a separate trial 
as to each parcel. Such procedure would have made 
it necessary to rehash all of the evidence at each trial 
and there would, of course, have been six verdicts and 
six judgments, with the possibility of six appeals. 
How would such procedure contribute to avoiding 
"an inordinately long trial with attendant burden 
upon court personnel and parties" as claimed by Mr. 
Brayton in his affidavit (R. 46)? 
We always conceded that it was not only per-
missible, but proper, for appellants to present evidence 
of the location, character and condition of the prop-
erty and the highest use for which any and all areas 
of the land were suitable, and that, based on such evi-
dence, the jury should determine the value of the 
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land as a whole; but it would have been a foolish pro-
cedure to hold a separate trial for fixing the value of 
each of the six arbitrarily platted areas simply because 
one area was, in the sole opinion of Mr. Brayton, suit-
able for commercial purposes, another or others for 
residential purpose and another "of no potential com-
mercial or residential value," but had located on it a 
spring as shown on said map. 
Whether the trial court might have fixed differ-
ent boundaries to the two parcels is not important. 
After all the purpose was to arriv·e at the market value 
of each parcel with all improvements, considering the 
highest purpose for which it was adaptable. 
Severance Damages 
Appellants complain of the court's ruling in 
striking from their "Separate Answer" (R. 21) the 
following averments: 
''4. That by taking from these defend-
ants a part only ·of the two different and sep-
arate parcels described above as Area I-D and 
IV -B south of Kennedy Drive, damages have 
accrued to the portion of said parcels owneq by 
these defendants not sought to be condemned 
by reason of severance from the portions sought 
to be condemned by plaintiff in the sum of 
$14,000.00." (R. 39.) 
Please note that there is no description of the 
land not taken and no allegation as to how or in what 
manner it was damage·d by the segregation. (Tilla-
mook County v. Johnson, 190 P. 159.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
What do appellants claim was severed from what? 
They say in the above allegation that plaintiff took 
only parts of two parcels they designate as Area I-D 
and Area IV-B (see map R. 78). 
Area I-D is described in the Answer ( R. 2 9) 
as consisting of two parcels, one of which is north 
of Kennedy Drive and the other south of the Drive 
(both colored in yellow), which latter area, it is 
alleged (R. 30), is part of a parcel lying south of 
Kennedy Drive owned by appellants. 
Area IV-B (see map) consists of one tract of 
10.33 acres north of Kennedy Drive and the re-
mainder, 5.43 acres south of Kennedy Drive, which, 
it is alleged, is part of another separate and differ-
ent parcel owned by appellant and not sought to be 
condemned, extending south of Kennedy Drive. 
The parcels referred to in I-D and IV -B, not 
sought to be condemned, are one and the same. 
Counsel asserts that by striking the said alle-
gation (par. 4, R. 39) the court eliminated the issue 
of damage to the property not taken. Such is not 
the fact, for the reason that in the Complaint it is 
alleged: 
'' 1 0. That each of the parcels or tracts 
sought to be condemned as hereinabove referred 
to and set forth is the whole of an enetire par-
cel or tract of property or interest in or to prop-
·erty owned b~y the aforesaid defendants., (R. 
19.) 
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(This was proved by the maps "Ex. A" and 
''Ex. 1 '' and other evidence.) 
This allegation is denied by appelants, and in the 
prayer of the Answer (which was not stricken) ap-
pellants ask: 
''For severance damages to the property owned 
by these defendants south of the general area 
sought to be condemned, $14,000.00." (R. 41.) 
Under this state of the pleadings (respondent 
having made prima facie proof that the land was "the 
whole of an entire tract") the issue of whether the 
tract to be condemned was the whole or merely a 
part of appellants' holdings was just as effectively 
raised as by the allegation stricken by the court, 
which, if it had remained in the Answer, would 
have been de·emed denied. The land referred 
to, not sought to be taken, is not described.,... 
~ in appellants' denial of paragraph 10 of the 
complaint, (neither is it described in the stricken para-
graphs), but by such denial, whether there was other 
land, not taken, was before the court. Appellants had 
the burden of proving their damages (Tanner v. Ca .. 
nal etc. Co. 40 Utah 105, 121 P. 584; Minneapolis 
Dist. v. Fitzpatrick (Minn.) 277 N. W. 394) and 
therefore it was their duty, in making proof of dam-
age, to show, if such were the fact, that the property 
sought to be condemned was not the whole .of their 
property, and theirs was also the obligation, if they 
made such proof, to prove their damage, if any, to 
-the part of their property not taken. Howeve·r, this 
question of severance damage was entirely ignored by 
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appellants. They made no proof in support of their 
denial, or in response to respondents' affirmative 
proof. Appellants assumed throughout the trial that 
there was no other land of which the land tp_ken w~ 
a part, and made no offer of proof e£ ~.:t:T'a~Or'"...,. rJ ~ 
of damage to any such land. 
''Damage to land not taken will not be 
presumed, and unless the owner shows by com-
petent evidence that the value of his remaining 
land has been diminished by the taking, com-
pensation will be limited to the value of the 
land taken." 18 Am. Jur. pp. 985-6, and cases 
cited. 
As to this final point relied upon by appellants 
for reversal, we contend that, like the others, it is with-
out merit. 
-CONCLUSION 
This case has traveled a rough road. Much time 
has been consumed and much expense incurred because 
of numerous motions filed by appellants in the court 
below, by their application for intermediate appeal, 
proceedings for an extraordinary writ and by this 
appeal. Following the trial there never was any ob-
jection to the amount of the verdict, or to any pro-
ceedings by which the amount of compensation was 
determined, until the court refused to amend the judg-
ment so as to award interest from July 12, 1951. 
In their Application For Payment they asked 
for nothing more than to leave open for future liti-
gation the question of such interest, but because their 
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claim for interest· was denied (and no court could 
properly have done otherwise), they appeal to this 
court for a reversal based upon the particular "pointstt 
set forth in their Brief and which we have discussed. 
But, even here, they really abandon all such points 
except the one relating to interest, for in their Brief, 
pp. 21-22, they say: 
"A New Trial Is Not R'equired 
'' Ma thematically, the interest on the fair 
market value of the defendants' property be-
tween the date of the injury and the time when 
the amount of the award was determined can 
readily be computed. At six per cent it amounts 
to $ 2 4, 7 9 9. 3 2 for the period July 12, 19 51, 
until May 1 0, 19 52. 
''This amount the court below could and 
should have included in the judgment on the 
verdict, no jury question being involved. St. 
Louis etc. Ry Co. v. Oliver (Okla.), 87 P. 423, 
2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, S 742 _at page 
1324. 
''This error can be corrected by simple di-
rection of this court, no new trial or resub-
mission to the jury being required. 
"Thus in Reed v. Chicago, Milwaukee ~ 
St. Paul RR. Co. (C. C.), 25 F. 886, Mr. Jus-
tice Shiras said: 
" 'Until the verdict is rendered it cannot 
be known whether plaintiff tnay be entitled to 
interest. When this is determined by the 
amount of the verdict, the court can then make 
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the proper order, and the same will form part 
of the adjudication, settling damages.' 
"Accordingly, on appeal the Circuit Court 
determined the amount of interest to which plain-
tiff was entitled, added this to the amount of 
the verdict as returned by the jury, and ren-
dered judgment for the aggregate amount. 
"Again, the case of Alloway v. Nashville, 
88 Tenn. 510, 13 S. W. 123, 8 L.R.A. 123, 
was a condemnation proceeding. No instruc-
tion as to interest was given or requested and 
none was allowed by the jury. Before judg-
ment was rendered, Alloway moved the court 
to add interest, as the defendants did here for 
the Deere Estate; and there also the motion- was 
rejected and on appeal such refusal was assigned 
as error. The Supreme Court said: 
'' 'Refusal to add interest was error. * * * 
Inasmuch as the error can be readily corrected 
here, that will be done, instead of reversing and 
remanding. This court will render the judg-
ment that should have been rendered below.' 
"See also Warren v. St. Paul~ Pacific RR. 
Co., 21 Minn. 424, and Whiteacre v. St. Paul 
~ Sioux RR. Co., 24 Minn. 311, where the 
same practice is approved by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court; and also 3 Elliott on Railroads, 
p. 1457, and 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 277. 
"Finally, although the cases and authorities · 
are numerous enunciating the principle, we refer 
to the recent opinion of this court in Morris v. 
Russell, 236 P. 2d 451, where the same rule 
was invoked. References therein were made to 
decisions in Oklahoma, Texas, Kentucky, Illi-
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nois, artd to another recent decision of this court 
in Simmons v. Wilkin, 80 Utah 362, 15 P. 
2d 321." 
Assuming such an attitude, can this court be 
expected to consider any assignments of error other 
than the one relating to interest? Why bother about 
other points if appellants' grievance is really predi-
cated upon the refusal of the court to allow interest? 
Is the State to be put to the expense of re-litigating 
all the questions covered by the "Points Relied On" 
when appellants, in effect, confess that the award of 
the jury is quite satisfactory to them if only they can 
have interest on it? 
We have endeavored to be of assistance. to the 
court in the foregoing discussion and can only say in 
conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR., 
Attorney General. 
JESSE R. S. BUDGE, 
Special Assistant Attorney General. 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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